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ABSTRACT

There is a rising academic interest in the study of constitutional
states, particularlyin the Islamic world, whose legal and constitutional
structure is at least as a formal matter both founded on and subject to
religious doctrine. For those interested in the Arab Spring, and indeed
in constitutionalism in much of the Islamic world, this work is not
only valuable, but also positively vital. Without it, we are unable to
discuss most emerging Arab democracies in constitutional terms. In
Iraq and Egypt, two of the premier Arab states that have recently seen
constitutions approved through popular referendum, Islam is
described as a state religion, as a source of legislation, and as a constraint upon law as well. While the details may well differ from one
state to another, the principle of "constitutional theocracy" holds fast
throughout much of the Arab world. The effect of this on religious
minorities that are not Muslim is the subject of this essay, with particular reference to the one Arab state with which I am most familiar: Iraq.
In assessing how rising constitutional theocracies like Iraq balance
the prioritiesthey afford Islam in foundationaltext with religiousfreedom, a value also invariably enshrined in the constitutions of emerging democracies in the Middle East, it is important to note that the
going opinion is very much in favor of some form of protection for
and tolerance of non-Muslim minorities. It is also important to note
that in assessing any conflicts with shari'a, there is a great deal of
nuance, indeed near incoherence, in understandingnot only the precise impact which that body of rules is supposed to have as a legal
matter in the modern constitutional theocratic state, but also what the
rules of the shari'a even are and how much reinterpretationof the his* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
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toric content of the shari'a will be tolerated. This article will explore
this unusual dichotomy, and further explore how courts in the Kurdistan region have managed to come to different results, in a manner
altogether more promising for supporters of religious freedom.

I.

NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE ISLAMIC STATE

Legal scholars are increasingly interested in the study of constitutional
states, particularly in the Islamic world, where legal and constitutional
structures are, at least as a formal matter, both founded on and subject to
religious doctrine.' For those of us interested in the Arab Spring, and
indeed in constitutionalism in much of the Islamic world, this work is not
only valuable, but positively vital. Without this valuable work, we are
unable to discuss most emerging Arab democracies in constitutional
terms. In Iraq and in Egypt - two premier Arab states that have
recently seen constitutions approved through popular referendum Islam is described as a state religion, a source of legislation and a constraint upon law as well. 2 While the other states that have undergone or
are undergoing massive transition in the context of the Arab Spring have
yet to agree upon a final constitution, such constitutions will almost certainly enshrine a prominent place for Islam in the legal and constitutional
order.' The details may differ between states, but the principle of

I See generally RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010); Larry CatA
Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction To A New Global Legal
Ordering, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 93 (2009).
2 Article 2, Doustor Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq]

of 2005 (describing Islam as "a foundational source" of legislation) [hereinafter The
Constitution of Iraq]. unofficial English translation available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/454f50804.html. Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution remains, after
referendum, precisely the same as it was during the Mubarak era. The constitution
declares that the principles of the shari'a are "the main source of legislation."
Compare CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Dec. 15, 2012, art. 2,
with CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended,

May 22, 1980, art. 2. The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt has long interpreted
Article 2 to prohibit legislation that is contrary to the principles of the shari'a. CLARK

B.

IN MODERN EGYPT: THE
ISLAMIC LAW
STATE LAW AS
LOMBARDI,
INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI'A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2 (2006).

3 The three other states most identified with massive regime change in the context
of the Arab Spring are Syria, Libya and Tunisia. At the time of the publication, Syria
is mired in an intractable civil war as between insurgents seeking to remove the
dictatorial regime of Bashar al-Asad and a Syrian army which seeks to keep the
regime intact. Jonathan Steele, Kerry's Syria Problem: The New Secretary of State
Should Resist the SNC and US Hawk and Push for Talks, Not Arms, THE GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Feb. 26, 2013 at 28. While in a better position than Syria, Libya's
constitutional processes also appear to have stagnated, as an assembly elected to draft
a constitution instead called for new elections for a new body to write a constitution.
Chris Stephen, Libya's Revolution Stagnates as Rubbish Piles Up in Tripoli, THE
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holds fast throughout much of the Arab

4

world.
The effect of this broad use of Islam in the constitutions of Arab states
on non-Muslim religious minorities is the subject of this article, with a

particular focus on Iraq. This is a matter of some concern in the West in
particular, and one, therefore, with important ramifications for international relations and foreign policy.
The concern is a natural one. After all, it is hard to treat a religion as
the exclusive official faith of the state, to use it as a form of state identity,
and to insist that it will be the source of legislation and a basis to constrain it, and not to wonder, indeed to worry, about the treatment of nonadherents to that religion in that polity. As I shall demonstrate, significant problems have emerged.
At the same time, it is important to frame the issue in a manner that
does not overstate it. It is simply not the case that in the democracies
emerging out of the Arab spring, there is any present intention to prohibit religious freedom altogether in any recognizable form.' Arab legal
and political elites are as aware of, and influenced by, global norms concerning respect for religious freedom as others, and they have long inter-

nalized those norms to a significant extent. Constitutions throughout the
Arab world, whether in authoritarian states or rising democracies, frequently make references to religious freedom, as does the Cairo Declaration for Human Rights in Islam, a much maligned document intended to

(U.K.), Feb. 16, 2013 at 36. Tunisia seems the most promising of the three
states, though it is suffering a crisis of its own, as between secularists and the leading
Islamist party, the moderate Ennahda, with a constitutional transition process set to
begin in the summer of 2013. Currently, it is being run under an interim constitution
commonly referred to as the "Little Constitution." John Thorne, Tunisia Wobbles
Further as PM Resigns and Credit Rating Drops, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb.
20, 2013. Tunisia is the Arab state which has long been identified as a "bastion of
Arab secularism." Monica Marks and Kareem Fahim, Tunisia Moves to Contain
Fallout After Opposition Figure is Assassinated, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2013 at A6. The
fact that it is currently being led by an Islamist party in a coalition government
demonstrates well the appeal of a role for Islam in the legal and constitutional order
throughout the Arab world.
I See HIRSCHL, supra note 1, at 2 (defining "constitutional theocracy" and outlining
its appeal). Backer, whose views differ from Hirschl's in important respects, adopts
the term "theocratic constitutionalism," which is substantially similar. Backer, supra
note 1, at 85-86.
5 It is true that some Islamic states, most notably Saudi Arabia, appear to offer no
constitutional protections to non-Muslim minorities. ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 148 (5th ed. 2013). However, as the
main text demonstrates, this is very much the exception rather than the rule, and
certainly is hardly a fair characterization of the rising Arab democracies.
GUARDIAN
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demonstrate a peculiarly "Islamic" approach to human rights.' The point
is not that such provisions are as robust as might be found elsewhere
around the globe either in their terms or their application - in some
cases, plainly they are not.7 Rather, the point is that there is a sufficient
enough conception of religious freedom and recognition of its importance
to result in its appearance in various foundational texts.
Moreover, even to the extent that Arab elites had not internalized
religious freedom norms, the international community certainly played,
and will continue to play, a role in constitution making in rising Arab
democracies. This role is manifested not so much in directing the drafters
within the Arab democracies to include particular provisions, but rather,
in communicating global expectations to them.8 The importance of conforming to such expectations would surely not be lost on the drafters,
who would presumably prefer not to be deemed pariahs in the international community.
As a result, although it might be perfectly obvious that secularists are
strong defenders of the right of peoples of all faiths to practice their religions freely, there is little objection from Islamist forces, who insist that
Islam is fundamentally a tolerant and humane religion and that compulsion in religion is prohibited by the Qur'an itself.9 Indeed, Islamic law
6

In Article 10, the Cairo Declaration prohibits forcible conversions, or conversions

obtained by exploiting poverty and ignorance. Organisation of the Islamic
Conference, Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam art. 35, U.N. GAOR, 4th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (Aug. 5, 1990), available at http://wwwl.
umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html [hereinafter Cairo Declaration]. The
specific matter of Iraq's constitutional text is outlined in further detail in Part II infra.
Morocco's 1996 Constitution, which was amended and approved by referendum in
2011, grants rights to freedom of worship to all religions in Article 6. CONSTITUTION
OF THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO, Mar. 10, 1972, as amended, Oct. 7, 1996, art. 6.
Egypt's 2012 Constitution contains a provision in Article 43 guaranteeing religious
freedom, though only for followers of monotheistic religions. CONSTITUTION OF THE
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Dec. 15, 2012, art. 43. Constitutions of authoritarian
states within the region containing references to religious freedom include Jordan
(Art.14) and Syria (Art. 35). THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF
JORDAN, Jan. 11, 1952, art. 14; CONSTITUTION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, Feb.
27, 2012, art. 35, translated in THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE SYRIAN

2012).
supra note 5, at 147 (offering critique of Cairo Declaration).

CONSTITUTION MODIFICATIONS (Qordoba

1 See, e.g.,

MAYER,

8 Hasan Yasiri, a leading legal, technical drafter of the Iraqi Constitution indicated
in a recent conference in Cairo that over six hundred civil service organizations had
offered advice and commentary on the Iraq constitution in its drafting phase. Hasan
Yasiri, Remarks at the Conference on the Constitutions in the Nations of the Arab

Spring (Cairo, December 5, 2012).

One would expect significant, similar

contributions from international actors in any Arab state seeking a transition to
democratic rule.
9 QUR'AN 2:256 ("Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear
from Error: whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah hath grasped the most
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jurists, whether of the Sunni variety in Azhar or the Shi'a of Najaf, are

quick to proclaim their support for the freedoms of religious minorities,
castigating terrorist attacks upon Christian churches and declaring Chris°
tian communities to be vital parts of the national community.' To do
otherwise - to depart, that is, from the general consensus that non-Muslim populations are entitled to some form of respect - seems in much of
the Arab world to be uncivilized.
The real question is thus not whether there is any understanding of
religious freedom among elites in the Arab world, Islamist or otherwise."
Instead, the real question is precisely how far these rights actually extend,
and in particular, whether they qualify or limit particular, traditional
interpretations of the shari'athat hold sway over the Muslim imagination.
However, even this qualified question is more nuanced than it initially
appears. Specifically, to answer it with any degree of particularity, it is
important to note a significant difference between suggesting that the
shari'a - the vast body of varying and various norms and rules developed by medieval and modern jurists from Islamic foundational text - is
supreme in constitutional theory, and to suggest that it is so in practice. I
have sought to demonstrate at greater length in previous articles that any
claim of fealty to religious doctrine in Islamic states is hardly consistent,
neither in its methodology for using the shari'a as a source of, and con-2
straint upon, legislation, nor in its determination of what shari'a is.1
Both of these, shari'a content and shari'a applicability, add further complexity to the picture.
Thus, no Arab state actually looks particularly closely at shari'a to
develop its corporate or commercial regimes, for example, because of its
incompatibility with the realities of modern economies.1 3 The source of
such laws is not the shari'a that the constitutions of the region call for, but
instead the source is plainly Western in origin - transplants, as it were,
from Europe or the United States." Concepts that have no historic
Islamic pedigree, such as companies with independent personality and
trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all
things.") (Yusuf Ali trans.).
10 See, e.g., Azhar Condemns Attack on Aswan Church, AHRAM

ONLINE

(Oct. 5,

2011), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/23405/Egypt/Politics-/ElAzharcondemns-attack-on-Aswan-church-.aspx (describing Azhar criticisms of attack on
Coptic Church in Aswan, Egypt); Leaders Condemn Iraq Church Bombs, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 2, 2004, 7:01 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/3527032.stm
(describing Sistani criticism of attacks on Iraq churches).
11 See, e.g., Cairo Declaration, supra note 6.
12 Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
293, 294-95 (2010).
13 Id. at 324-25; HIRCHL, supra note 1, at 12.
'" See Lama Abu Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)Recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy
in American Academia, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 789, 790 (2004) (pointing out central role
of transplanted law in legal systems throughout the Muslim world).
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limited liability, 15 are an integral part of the commercial infrastructure of
modern Arab states and do not solicit objection from any significant
mainstream political movement, even Islamist ones.16
This lack of objection to non-shari'a based corporate and commercial
regimes is partly due to a rejection of the historic and traditional interpretations of juristic texts, a re-evaluation of shari'a content as it were. 17
However, not all of it is. Even commercial practices routinely condemned by modern Islamic scholars as prohibited, most notably the taking of interest, are frequently, indeed almost invariably, legal.18 Political
and legal elites faced with the choice of either declaring the giving or
taking of interest prohibited, or admitting that not necessarily all law
must conform to shari'a, tend to either ignore the problem or construct
embarrassing and implausible legal arguments to avoid choosing among
the unsatisfying alternatives. 19
15 TIMUR KURAN, THE LONG DIVERGENCE

60-61 (2011).

16 Hamoudi, supra note 12, at 325.

17 See, e.g., Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad's Social Justice or Muslim Cant?:
Langdellianismand the Failureof Islamic Finance,40 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 89, 128-29
(2007) (describing in greater detail Sanhuri's justificatory approach to the legalization

of the taking of interest).
18 Thus, for example, the Civil Codes of numerous Arab States, including those of
Egypt, Iraq and Kuwait, were drafted by the greatest Arab jurist of the twentieth
century, Abdul Razzaq al Sanhuri. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAI'M, ISLAM AND THE
SECULAR STATE 17-18 (2010). The Sanhuri Codes plainly permit the taking of
interest; Sanhuri in fact goes to great lengths to justify this in his own lengthy treatise
on the relationship of shari'a to the modern Civil Code. See 'ABD AL-RAZZAQ
AHMAD SANHURI, 3 MASADIR AL-HAQQ FI AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI: DIRASA MUQARANAH
BI-AL-FIQH AL-GHARBI [THE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH WESTERN JURISPRUDENCE] 241-44 (1954). See also

Hamoudi, supra note 17, at 128-29.
19 Most instructive is the case of Egypt. Faced with the unappealing prospect of

either destroying Egypt's economy (by declaring interest unlawful because contrary
to shari'a) or being dismissed by the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters as
inauthentic interpreters of Islamic text (by declaring interest to be consonant with
shari'a), Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court engaged in an artful dodge. See
Shari'a and Riba, Case No. 20/1985/Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt), translated
in 1 ARAB L.Q. 100, 104 (1985). It held that the matter was non-justiciable. Id. This is
because the relevant amendment to the Constitution requiring all law to conform to
shari'awas adopted in 1985 - after the rules permitting interest were already part of

Egyptian law. Id. To quote the Court more fully:
[T]he obligation imposed on the [legislature] to follow the principles of the
shari'a and to consider them as the source of legislation is aimed only at the
legislative enactments which are issued after the date of the imposition of the
said obligation, and does not cover former legislative enactments ....

[O]nly

such new legislative enactments fall within the prohibition to the effect that they
should not be contrary to the principles of Islamic law.... [I]t follows the above

that only the legal enactments issued after the coming into effect of the
obligation to conform to Islamic law are affected, so that, should any such legal
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This decision to overlook shari'a arises when there is money to be
made, but not when there are women to be suppressed - in the context

of the law of the family, for example. In such instances, the shari'a is
regarded as central; even the opportunistic selection of rules from among
different historic schools of thought, deemed a perfectly commonplace
20
method of Islamic reasoning in the context of Islamic finance, can be
met with fierce condemnation. 1
For example, over the last few decades there has been a consistent
effort in Iraq to repeal the state's Personal Status Code (containing both
family and inheritance law), itself largely an amalgamation of shari'a
rules from different schools of thought, and replace it with uncodified
shari'a as determined by the jurists of the sect of the litigants that might
22
appear before the court in any particular context. There has thus long
been strident objection within Iraq to the incorporation of different rules
from various schools of thought to govern the area of personal status
law.2 3 The demand has been to restore rulemaking authority over personal status to jurists, not to legislators who may pick and choose among
juristic rulings they prefer.2 4 If the opportunistic selection of rules from
enactments be in conflict with the principles of Islamic law, such legal enactments
alone would fall in the domain of constitutional illegality .... [L]egal enactments
which antedated the amendment are not affected by the obligation to conform
because they were in existence before that limitation became due for
implementation. [C]onsequently, such prior enactments are immune from the
application of the limitation because of its anterior date, which is the determining
factor on which proper constitutional control is based.
Id. (emphasis added).
In other words, laws enacted prior to a constitutional amendment are immune from
the effects of that amendment. A similar ruling in the United States would have held
the slavery laws as they existed in the former Confederacy immune from the
application of the Thirteenth Amendment. It is, to say the least, a difficult
proposition to support.
20 See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE:
RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN 37 (1998) (describing such "utilitarian choice" as the
methodology upon which Islamic finance relies to develop its structural and
organizational rules).
21 See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (demonstrating the objections to
Iraq's Personal Status Code precisely because it is an amalgam of different rules from
different Islamic schools of thought).
22 Kristen Stilt offers a helpful summary of these efforts through 2003. Kristen A.
Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Islamic Legal System, 36 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 751-55 (2004).

23 Id. at 752. As Stilt notes, the significant jurist of note primarily responsible for
giving voice to the objections to Iraq's Personal Status Code, Muhammad Bahr ulUlum, opposed even provisions that came from his sect, on the theory that requiring
any Muslim to follow the rules of jurists he did not believe in was itself problematic.
Id. Needless to say, Iraq's commercial and corporate laws are not built on such an
unworkable theory of pluralism. Id. at 751-52.
24 Id.
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among those of some traditional and historic Islamic pedigree is met with
this objection, then it is unsurprising that legal invention independent of
very historic and very traditional juristic derivation of sacred text is met
with even greater derision in matters of personal status.2 5 This is the case
even if such inventions are no more a departure from traditional juristic
manuals than the creation of limited liability companies with separate
juridical personalities are in the corporate context.26 It seems that the
ability to reinvent Islamic rules depends on the area of law at issue.
The lesson derived from this inconsistency in approaching and understanding shari'a is that while it is important to conceptualize emerging
democratic Arab states as "constitutional theocracies," of a sort, this formal designation only takes us so far when assessing precisely what this
means in any given context. It is important, but not enough, to say that
Islam is "an integral part, or even the metaphorical pillar of the polity's
national metanarrative ... determin[ing] the polity's boundaries of collec-

tive identity, as well as the rights and duties assigned to its residents., 27
This is because the "metaphorical" pillar is a highly imperfect one. At
times, the pillar is deemed eternal and unchanging, and no methodology
other than the strict application of one particular interpretation of shari'a
will be tolerated.28 At others, a far more liberal, patchwork method is
broadly used, and the possibility of legal invention or religious reinterpretation is far more possible.2 9
Thus, in assessing how rising constitutional theocracies like Iraq happen to balance the priorities they afford Islam in foundational text with
religious freedom, it is important to note that popular opinion is very
much in favor of some form of protection for and tolerance of non-Muslim minorities. It is also important to note that in assessing any conflicts
with shari'a,there is a great deal of nuance, almost incoherence, in understanding not only the precise impact which that body of rules is supposed
to have as a legal matter in the modern constitutional theocratic state, but
also what the rules of the shari'a are and how much reinterpretation of its
content will be tolerated. With that important context in mind, we can
25 Again, Egypt proves instructive. President Sadat sought to reform Egypt's
family laws by providing for a number of protections for women that did not exist in
the shari'aas traditionally derived, including a right to alimony for up to two years for
women divorced by their husbands without valid cause. LOMBARDI, supra note 2 at
170. The objection from Islamist parties was quite fierce, and the law, dubbed
"Jihan's law" after the name of Sadat's wife, was derided as the product of a
henpecked husband. Id. at 169-70.
26 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
27 HIRSCHL, supra note 1,

at 3.

28 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (objecting to the application of

shari'aexcept in a traditional manner, strictly by school of though).
29 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (suggesting a more flexible

approach to shari'a in the corporate and commercial contexts).
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attempt to approach more soundly the question of the place of the nonMuslim in the emerging Iraqi constitutional theocracy.
Part II will describe the precise constitutional formulations that Iraq
deploys to realize both the prominent role of Islam in the legal framework of the nation-state as well as a robust form of religious freedom.
Effectively, the drafters of the Constitution managed the divisions
between secularists and Islamists by giving each side the constitutional
phrasing it sought concerning religious freedom and Islam, respectively,
without even attempting to manage the tensions that might thereby arise.
Thus, the Constitution conferred upon the judiciary broad power to
develop the law.
Part III will then turn to Iraqi praxis. It will demonstrate that where
traditional rules of the shari'a have been all but abandoned by modern
nation-states, particularly inasmuch as political equality as between Muslim and non-Muslim is concerned, it has been easier for the judiciary to
advance notions of religious freedom and, perhaps more saliently, equality of citizens irrespective of religion. Indeed, Iraqi courts and legislators
not only permit non-Muslim participation in legal and political affairs, but
advance programs to ensure adequate non-Muslim representation in the
legislature.
However, as Part IV shows, in contradistinction to political freedoms
afforded to non-Muslim minorities, courts are more cautious when it
comes to recognizing vital elements of religious freedom and religious
equality if to do so would directly challenge traditional understandings
of shari'a where such understandings remain relevant in modernity. This
remains the case even in areas where the actual role of shari'a in the legal
infrastructure of the state is slight. This part will show the manner in
which courts deal with this, both within Iraq generally and in the more
secular autonomous region of Kurdistan, which has developed quite different precedents. It will conclude by demonstrating that the debate
within the Iraqi courts is not only over methodology - where shari'ais
supposed to remain relevant - but it is also over content, or precisely
over what the rules of the shari'a are.
By exposing all of this complexity and nuance, I do not claim to offer in
these few pages any coherent formula for understanding either the content of shari'a in the modern Muslim state, or the means by which it is
used to inform and constrain law. Indeed, I claim no such rigid formula
exists. I only hope to frame the questions and considerations more precisely in one nation-state, in the hopes that this might inform others as
they continue to grapple with these issues elsewhere.
II.

IRAQI CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT

Commentators have extensively discussed the bitter social, political,
ethnic, and religious divisions that Iraqi constitution makers faced as they
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sought to draft a consensual constitution. 0 The one area of division relevant to this article concerns the extent to which Islam was to play a role in
the nation state."1 Iraq's premier Shi'i Islamist 2 parties during constitutional negotiations quite plainly sought a prominent role not only for
shari'a, but also for the juristic authorities, who according to core Shi'i
theological notions, have the authority to pronounce it.33 Sunni Islamists
also favored a robust role for shari'a,yet resisted any suggestion of deference to the Shi'i juristic authorities in Najaf in determining its content
and contours.3 4 The Kurds were undoubtedly Iraq's most secular population. They acknowledged a role for Islam in the state, but sought to keep
it relatively constrained. 5 In this effort, the Kurds were joined by secular
nationalists,
who were primarily, though by no means exclusively,
36
Sunni.
30 See, e.g., ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION: THE
POLITICS OF IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 50 (2009); Haider Ala Hamoudi,
Identitarian Violence and Identitarian Politics: Elections and Governance in Iraq, 51
HAR. Int'l L.J. 82, 86-87 (2010).
31 Many of the deepest divisions within Iraq that became manifest during
constitutional drafting dealt with areas that had almost nothing to do with Islam, such
as federalism and de-Baathification. See ALl A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ:
WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE PEACE 148-50 (2007) (describing divisions over deBaathification); Feisal Amin Rasoul al-Istrabadi, A Constitution Without
Constitutionalism: Reflections On Iraq's Failed Constitutional Process, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 1627, 1629 (2009) (noting that federalism was the most divisive issue during
constitutional negotiations). These matters are, of course, well beyond the scope of
the current paper.
32 Throughout this article, I use the term "Islamist" to refer broadly to one who
seeks a greater role for the shari'a in the legal infrastructure of the nation-state. As
such, the term would exclude Al Qaeda, which rejects the very concept of the nationstate, and it would exclude political parties such as Turkey's AKP, which repeatedly
denies that it thinks that Islam has any role in political order. See, e.g., Susanna
Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern
Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 126 (2002) (quoting Turkish Premier Erdogan as
indicating that the AKP endorsed secularism and was against "the exploitation of
religion and ... distorting ... secularism by misinterpreting it as animosity against
religion.").
33 Haider Ala Hamoudi, OrnamentalRepugnancy: IdentitarianIslam and the Iraqi
Constitution, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 692, 697 (2010).
34 Id. at 698-99.
35 Id. at 698.
36 The leader of the current Iraqiya coalition, Ayad Allawi, is a secular nationalist
and a Shi'i, even if he draws most of his support from the Sunni population.
Hamoudi, supra note 30, at 83. The Kurdish-Iraq nationalist alliance is somewhat
ironic, because there was little else on which the two sides agreed. By and large,
nationalists sought to limit the scope of federalism in Iraq, preferring a highly
centralized state, while the Kurdish leadership represented Iraq's uber-federalist
contingent, seeking a confederated state in which the nation's capital, Baghdad,
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The Sunnis, Shi'a and Kurds were the primary domestic players. Iraq's
non-Muslim minorities by contrast, constituted less than 5% of the population.37 Thus, they were sufficiently small as not to be able to act as a
significant influence during the negotiations, though certainly they had
representation in the drafting sessions.38 To the extent that their interests
were advanced, it was either due to the commitment of the international
community, or the ideological commitments of the Muslim drafters who,
as noted earlier, considered themselves
without exception proponents of
9
the principle of religious freedom.
What emerged from all of this was consensual language that was sufficiently ambiguous and to some extent contradictory as to be appealing to
all sides. Hence, Article 2 of Iraq's Constitution reads as follows:
Article 2
First: Islam is the official religion of the state, and it is a foundational source of legislation:
No law may be enacted that contradicts with the established provisions of Islam.
No law may be enacted that conflicts with the principles of
democracy.
No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this Constitution.
Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the
majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights to
freedom of religious belief and practice, of all individuals such as
4°
Christians, Yazidis, and Mandeans Sabeans.

would be kept extraordinarily weak. ALLAWI, supra note 31, at 409; al-Istrabadi,
supra note 31, at 1629-33.
37 The Christian community, composed primarily of Chaldeans and Assyrians, is
estimated to be about 2% of the population. ALLAWI, supra note 31, at 20. The other
religious minorities, primarily the Yazidis and the Sabians, are even less. Id. Iraq also
once had a significant Jewish population, but it has almost entirely disappeared. Id. at
19. This came about after decades of pan-Arab political leadership hostile to Israel
and fierce repression of the Jewish community as somehow suspect in its loyalties to
the Iraqi state. See KANAN MAKIYA, REPUBLIC OF FEAR: THE POLITICS OF MODERN

IRAQ (2d ed. 1998) (describing early efforts of Ba'ath party to target Iraqi Jews).
38 In connection with my upcoming book on the drafting and interpretive
evolution of the Iraq constitution, entitled Negotiating in Civil Conflict and to be
published at the end of 2013 by the University of Chicago Press, I was given
extraordinary access to meeting minutes, memoranda and draft proposals prepared in
the midst of constitutional negotiations. The documentation clearly reflects the
participation of non-Muslim minorities, and the Christian minority in particular in the
negotiating process.
39 See, e.g., supra note 6.
40 Article 2, The Constitution of Iraq.
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Article 14 later indicates that Iraqis are equal before the law irrespective of a number of factors, including both religion and sect.4 1 Freedom
of conscience and freedom of religious exercise are reiterated later in
Articles 42 and 43.42 Article 42 extends "to each individual freedom of
thought, conscience and belief,"4 3 and Article 43 specifically references
non-Muslims by granting religious exercise rights to "the followers of all
religions and sects."4 4
The constitution and its relationship to Islam is broader than these provisions alone,4 5 but for the purposes of understanding the nature of the
balance as between the rights and freedoms afforded to non-Muslim
minorities on the one hand, and the general, robust constitutional recognition of Islam as state religion, this will suffice. The articles demonstrate
well the tensions inherent in the formulations. If Islam is a foundational
source of legislation, could a Christian serve in the legislature and be
tasked with voting to enact law that at least in theory claims Islam as
source material? Would the historic treatment of religious minorities in
an Islamic polity be at all relevant to answering the previous question,
given the requirement that law conform to Islam's "settled rulings"? If
the state has the obligation to sustain Islam as a source of identity for its
Muslim citizens, does this mean that conversion from Islam is to be prohibited, consistent with historically dominant understandings of Islamic
sacred text? What is left of the freedom of belief if so? What are we to
understand as Islam's settled rulings if not?
Obviously, this tension could only be resolved in the courts. The next
two parts will describe more fully precise Iraqi judicial and legislative
practice, and its deference to broader global expectations at some times,
to historic conceptions of religious doctrine at others, and to reinterpreted "modernist" doctrine in yet others. This amalgamation reflects
well the haphazard and selective attachment to disparate conceptions of
shari'a that prevail among Muslims in modernity.

41

Id., art. 14.

Id., arts. 42-43.
Id., art. 42.
44 Id., art. 43.
41 Most notably, Article 41 of the Iraqi Constitution indicates that Iraqis are free to
live by their own rules of personal status according to their beliefs, their choices, their
religions and their sects. Id., art. 41. This article has been understood to be a call for
the repeal of Iraq's Personal Status Code and its replacement with more traditional
conceptions of shari'a,though as with Article 2, its language is ambiguous and capable
of different constructions. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Judicial Review of Islamic Law
Under Iraq's Constitution, JURIST (Apr. 26, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/04/
haider-hamoudi-iraq-islam.php (describing Article 41 and a Federal Supreme Court
decision relating to it).
42
43
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POLITICAL EQUALITY AND NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES

Historically, under classical conceptions of the shari'a as it existed during the Middle Ages, the only non-Muslims who were permitted to reside
peacefully in the geographic territory known as the Abode of Islam were
known as dhimmis.4 6 Originally, the dhimmis were understood to be
members of other monotheistic faiths who followed a Scripture from a
Prophet recognized in Islam, primarily Christians and Jews, though the
category was expanded over time to include those who clearly did not fit
within such parameters, such as Hindus in South Asia.4 7
While the dhimmis certainly enjoyed significant levels of autonomy
organizing their civil and political affairs, classical manuals illustrate their
second-class status.48 For instance, dhimmis were required to pay a tax,
known as the jizya.4 0 Officials quite often extracted the tax in a humiliating fashion to demonstrate dhimmi subjugation to Muslim rule.5 ° In
addition, there were strict limitations on the manner in which dhimmis
could build houses of worship; for example, Al-Shaybani, a leading classical jurist on the subject, insists that dhimmis could only repair houses of
worship, not build new ones. 1 Other rules required specific forms of
dress5" (wearing bells in public bathhouses)53 and rules regarding where
dhimmis could reside. 4 The point of these rules, ultimately, was to
emphasize Islam's priority throughout the Abode of Islam."
With this history in mind, if the words of the Iraqi Constitutionare to
mean anything, then they must (and do) represent a significant rejection
on the part of Iraq's legal and political elite of some of these positively
medieval notions. It simply does not make sense to grant "all individuals . . . the entirety of religious rights . . ." as Article 2 does,56 and somehow mean that to exclude the possibility that religious minorities may
build houses of worship. Equality under the law irrespective of one's
46 JOHN KELSAY, ARGUING THE JUST WAR IN ISLAM
THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI'S SIYAR

47 KHADDURI,

99 (2007);

MAJID KHADDURI,

11 (1966).

supra note 46, at 11; KELSAY, supra note 46, at 40.

48 KHADDURI, supra note 46, at 11.
49 Id.
50 KRISTEN STILT,

ISLAMIC

LAW IN

ACTION: AUTHORITY,

DISCRETION

AND

EVERYDAY EXPERIENCES IN MAMLUK EGYPr 123 (2011) ("The jurists largely agreed

that the individual must pay the tax in person, rather than paying through an
intermediary, such as the head of the religious community, in part to allow the
collector to insult or otherwise make each non-Muslim taxpayer feel personally
degraded.").
51 KHADOURI, supra note 46, at 277.
52 Id.
53 STILT, supra note 50, at 116.
54 KHADDURI, supra note 46, at 277-78.
5 KELSAY, supra note 46, at 40.
56 Article 2, The Constitution of Iraq.
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religion, required by Article 14," is a meaningless concept if it prohibits
members of particular faiths from residing in particular areas, requires
them to wear particular forms of dress, or subjects them to particular
forms of taxation.
Of course, it should be no surprise that modern Muslims in Iraq or
elsewhere are not constrained by how medieval jurists interpreted Islam's
holiest texts, particularly where those rules are more the product of juristic speculation than the revelatory text itself.5" Yet, even conceding this
and noting the profound changes in the Muslim world since the end of the
Ottoman Empire, we still might question whether some of these historic
political notions survived the social and political ruptures brought about
by colonialism and modernity, particularly in limiting the political participation of non-Muslim minorities. While it may be obvious that a Christian will not be required to wear special dress or pay a special tax, a more
restricted question might be asked. Given Islam's priority in Article 2 of
the Iraq Constitution, might a Christian's political participation be circumscribed in narrower ways? 5 9
The answer, quite plainly, is no. To take the simplest and most significant example, not only does Article 68 of the Constitution not mention
anything respecting religion in setting out the qualifications for the office
of President, but a subsequent law attaching additional qualifications for
presidential nominees does not mention religion either.6" Similarly, no
political position, save those that concern exclusively religious affairs, 6
57 Id., art. 14.
58 KHADDURI,

supra note 46, at 19.

59 Article 2, The Constitution of Iraq.
60

Law for the Rules for the Nomination for President of the Republic No. 8 of

2012 (Iraq), art. 1 [hereinafter Rules for the Nomination for President]. Specifically,
Article 1 of the law adds two conditions not set forth in Article 68. One, that the
President not be subject to disqualification because of membership in Saddam
Hussein's now banned Ba'ath party, is set forth elsewhere in the Constitution, in
Article 136. See Article 136, The Constitution of Iraq. The other is a requirement
that the President have a bachelor's degree from an institution recognized by Iraq's
Higher Education Ministry. See Rules for the Nomination for President. It is fair to
point out that the idea that a legislature could impose an additional qualification
necessary for the Office of the Presidency beyond that which the Constitution
indicates hardly seems supportable. The point here, however, is that the legislature
sought to do precisely that, and that no mention is made by it of a religious test, any
more than was made in the Constitution itself.
61 For example, Iraq has three separate laws permitting the establishment of waqfs,
effectively trusts set up under religious rules for charitable purposes. One is for the
Shi'a, one for the Sunnis, and one for Iraq's primary non-Muslim minorities Christians, Yazidis and Sabians. See Law of the Sunni Waqf Bureau No. 56 of 2012
(Iraq); Law of the Shi'i Waqf Bureau No. 57 of 2012 (Iraq); Law of the Waqf Bureau
of Christians, Sabian-Mandeans and Yazidis of 2012 (Iraq). Each of these laws, which
are remarkably parallel in structure, contain in article 4(2) a requirement that
relevant religious authorities must approve the head of the respective bureau, and in
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makes religion a qualification for holding office. In fact, during my many
years studying and writing on contemporary Iraq and speaking with
members of the Iraqi legal and political elite, I have never encountered
any suggestion, even from the most ardent Islamists, that the relationship
between citizen and state should be based on anything but nationality.
The idea that non-Muslim populations within Iraq are entitled to full de
jure political equality is in this sense broadly noncontroversial. Traditional shari'a notions are long dead, and quite modern concepts reign
supreme.
Not only are the equality provisions of the Iraq Constitution understood to prohibit political discrimination against non-Muslim minorities,
they also serve to advance the participation of non-Muslim minorities in
political affairs. In this vein, a recent case from Iraq's constitutional
court, the Federal Supreme Court, is instructive.62 In that case, an individual from a non-Muslim minority known as the Sabians challenged an
election law on the grounds that it violated the equality guarantee found
in Article 14 of the Iraqi Constitution.63 Specifically, the law awarded
Iraqi Christians five seats in the Iraqi parliament.6 4 Iraq was considered a
single electoral district for the purposes of these seats, meaning that anyone (of any religion) from anywhere in the country could vote for these
candidates, and the five candidates with the highest number of votes
would be elected to parliament.6 5 The five seats were a quota (both the
electoral law being challenged and the Court used an Arabic transliteration of the English word "quota" to describe it), 66 meaning that parliament would have at least five Christians irrespective of how many votes
article 6(d) require that clergy of the relevant religion or sect be members of its board
of directors. See Law of the Sunni Waqf Bureau No. 56 of 2012 (Iraq); Law of the
Shi'i Waqf Bureau No. 57 of 2012 (Iraq); Law of the Waqf Bureau of Christians,
Sabian-Mandeans and Yazidis of 2012 (Iraq). As these bureaus are responsible for
administering purely religious trusts established by private individuals under the
relevant rules of their religion, it is hardly controversial that such bureaus would be
run by or in close association with the clergy of particular religious institutions.
62 [Federal Supreme Court of Iraq], decision No. 6 of 2010, available at http://www.
iraqja.iq/viewd.744. Technically, the Federal Supreme Court is more than merely a
constitutional court, because it does have jurisdiction on matters that are not purely
constitutional, including, for example, disputes as between the central government
and an autonomous region or province, or between the subnational units. Article 93,
Sections 4-5, The Constitution of Iraq. However, in contradistinction to the United
States Supreme Court, and consonant with general global practice, the Supreme
Court is not the final court of general appeal. Ordinary appeals cannot be brought to
it.
63 [Federal Supreme Court of Iraq], decision No. 6 of 2010, p. 1 (Iraq).
64 Id. at 1.
65 Id.
66 Id.; Amending the Electoral Law No. 16 of 2005, Law No. 26 of 2009, art. 1(5)
0
(Iraq).
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those candidates received relative to any other candidates running in the
same election.
The Sabian contended that while his religious minority had a similar
one-candidate quota in parliament, the Sabian candidate could only run
in the Baghdad electoral district.67 Hence, no person from outside Baghdad could vote for him, and only candidates in Baghdad could contest the
seat.6" Given that Sabians inhabit many parts of Iraq, Sabian candidates
were disadvantaged relative to Christian candidates because only Sabians
in Baghdad could take advantage of the Sabian quota.69
The court agreed, indicating as follows:
[W]hereas the law ...regarded the seats set aside as a quota for
Christians to be within one electoral district ...and it did not extend
this right to the Sabian-Mandean sect, where it limited the right of
nomination and voting to Baghdad alone, as a result, the aforementioned law violates the principle of equality among Iraqis as it is set
forth in Article 14 of the Constitution. [This is] because the limitation of the right of voting of the Sabian minority to the governorate
of Baghdad alone harms the candidate as it harms the Sabian minority because it prevents the individuals of the sect from other
governorates from exercising their right, as a Sabian minority, in
their enjoyment of political rights which include the right to vote, to
be elected, and to be nominated, as set forth in Article 20 of the
Constitution. °
This rather remarkable conclusion bears some emphasis. Implicitly,
the Court affirmatively rejects the argument that setting aside particular
seats for a religious minority constitutes reverse discrimination, and
therefore a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The notion that
minority quotas violate equal protection thus resonates more with certain
members of the American judiciary than it does with the Iraqi judiciary.7 1
Indeed, the Iraqi court found it broadly uncontroversial to set aside particular seats for religious minorities to ensure that they have a voice - so
uncontroversial, in fact, that the Court does not even bother to justify its
conclusion.
What is objectionable to the Court is that having enabled the Christian
minority to run under quota protection and vote for Christian candidates
[Federal Supreme Court of Iraq], decision No. 6 of 2010, p. 1-2 (Iraq).
Id.
69 Id. at 2.
70 Id. at 5.
71 There is no real doubt, for example, that important members of the current
Supreme Court find various forms of affirmative action for racial minorities to be
themselves a denial of equal protection of the laws. See, e.g., Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J.) (describing a program designed to ensure racial integration in public
schools as a form of "discriminating on the basis of race").
67
68
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regardless of their location in Iraq, Sabians outside of Baghdad were not
granted the same dispensation. The issue was not whether or not Sabians
were entitled to vote wherever they happen to be located (clearly they
could), nor even whether they were entitled to run as candidates wherever they wished (clearly they could). Rather, the issue was whether the
legislature could design a quota system for Sabians mandating Sabian
participation with a scope limited to Baghdad and thus less extensive than
that granted to Christians. This, the Court decided, was unconstitutional
and a violation of equal protection. Clearly, Iraqi judicial and legislative
praxis takes the formal notion of political equality and political participation quite seriously.
VI.

RELIGIOUS EQUALITY AND RELIGIOUS CONVERSIONS

Unfortunately however, the story of religious minorities in the constitutional theocratic state is more nuanced than this. There are areas in
Iraq where the medieval-period priorities given to Islam quite clearly
continue in rather unexpected ways, and in a manner that disproportionately burdens religious minorities. Nowhere is this more obvious than in
religious conversions.
Under the classical system, dhimmi conversion to Islam was not only
permitted but positively incentivized,7 2 whereas conversion away from
Islam, or apostasy, was considered a crime. 73 Apostasy was among the
few crimes deemed to have been decreed by God, and therefore its prescribed penalty of death was unwaivable.7' However, the perpetrator was
generally given an opportunity to repent, in which case no punishment
would be applied. 5
Generally speaking, after the colonial era, the criminal laws of Arab
states have been, as with commercial laws, largely European in origin and
transplanted from Western sources. 76 As such, Iraq's Penal Code contains no reference to apostasy as a crime. 77 Moreover, given the principle
of nullum crimen sine legem that prevails in Iraq and throughout the Muslim world,78 the state cannot prosecute individuals on the grounds that
they have abandoned Islam in the absence of such a law.
72 See, e.g., KHADDURI, supra note 46, at 275 (reciting Shaybani's familiar rule that
the payment of the jizya is not due from one who converts, even as to amounts
previously due and owing).
73 RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW
74 Id.

65 (2005).

75 Id. (noting exception for Shi'a, who do not offer an opportunity for repentance
for those born Muslim).
76 Id. at 103.

77 See generally Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 (as amended) (Iraq).
78 KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL

AND

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 53 (2009) ("Islamic law countries today generally do
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However, just as the decriminalization of sodomy is only the beginning
of any gay rights movement, the absence of such a conversion law does
not necessarily mean that a Muslim may freely convert into another religion. That the state will not actively pursue the convert in the criminal
courts does not mean it will affirmatively agree to change his national
identity documents to reflect a change in religion.7 9 While this alone is
vitally important from a symbolic, identitarian perspective, state recognition of a citizen's religion has significant legal ramifications as well. For
example, under the shari'a derived Personal Status Code, a Muslim
woman may not marry a non-Muslim man,80 nor may a non-Muslim
inherit from a Muslim." l
The problem is particularly compounded for religious minorities as
concerns involuntary conversions. The number of born Muslims who
wish to convert to a religion other than Islam seems relatively low in Iraq;
certainly such matters do not appear to reach the courts with any degree
of frequency. I have yet to find a single case in which such a request was
made, though of course whether some were deterred less out of genuine
conviction and more out of social stigma is impossible to ascertain. It is
also rather unsurprising that those who voluntarily convert to Islam do
not appear to abandon their new faith in large numbers. More salient,
however, are those who were not born Muslim and did not attempt to
convert, but were converted by one of their parents while a minor. Iraqi
law has long regarded the conversion of a parent as effectively converting
a minor child, even over the objection of the non-converting parent.8 2
And once converted into Islam, the question might well be whether or
not such an individual upon reaching adulthood can convert back into
their original religion of choice.
In Saddam-era Iraq, the answer was resoundingly no, though based on
spurious legal grounds. The most well-known case comes from Iraq's
highest court of general appeal, the Court of Cassation, and dealt with
the attempted reconversion of a Sabian woman whose father had connot object to international law obligations respecting the non-retroactivity of criminal
law.").
79 Iraq's identity cards, both the Certification of Citizenship and the Civil Status
Identity Card, indicate one's religion on its face.
80 Personal Status Code No. 188 of 1959, art. 17 (Iraq).
81 Article 90 of the Personal Status Code indicates that the rules for the
distribution of estates are those that existed prior to the enactment of the Code, which
are effectively the established juristic rules respecting inheritance. See Personal Status
Law No. 188 of 1959, art. 90 (Iraq). It is abundantly clear that under such rules, nonMuslims may not inherit from Muslims. See, e.g., ALI SISTANI, MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN
2:320 (2008) (setting forth the familiar rule that "the nonbeliever does not inherit
from the Muslim, even if closely related").
82 The case discussed in the next paragraph makes this amply clear.

2013]

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND SHARI'A IN IRAQI COURTS

405

verted to Islam when she was ten years old."3 She made the request
within one year of reaching adulthood, claiming she had exercised her
right to do so within that time limit, as permitted in a 1988 executive
order. The Court of Cassation ruled that this order was overruled by a
subsequent order issued in 1994, and then pointed to two principles that it
said controlled in such matters.8 4 The first was that a young child became
a Muslim if either of the child's parents became a Muslim, and the second
was that once one became a Muslim directly or vicariously (i.e., through
the conversion of a parent), conversion from Islam was forbidden
because shari'a made conversion a crime.8 5 On the basis of these principles, the Court denied her request and the woman remained registered as
a Muslim.
Ironically, neither of these principles appears in Iraqi law. As noted,
while apostasy may well be a crime under the shari'a, it is not a crime
under Iraqi law. More importantly, Article 25 of the 1970 Interim Constitution in effect at the time contained broad protections for religious freedoms, and the 1970 Interim Constitution did not enshrine shari'a as part
86
of the state's legal framework.
The reliance of the Court on shari'a is therefore already difficult to
understand given the absence of any reference to shari'a in the legal
framework of the state at the time as it pertained to the crime of apostasy. The decision is also odd for two additional reasons. First, the Court
of Cassation is composed of judges of law, not clerics of religion, and the
Court does not often apply religious rules on which it has little formal
training in place of legal ones even when invited to do so." Second, the
Court was not actually applying shari'a in any recognizable fashion. If it
were, it would have imposed the death penalty, for the Sabian woman
had attempted to change her religion from Islam and failed to repent.
Rather, the Court denied an individual access to a modern, civil process
- a change of state documentation - and justified it on the basis of a
historic, religious crime for which Iraq and Iraqi courts recognized no
criminal sanction. Faulty and unsupportable as the reasoning was, it tellingly illustrates the biases of Iraqi judges and legal elites at the time.
83

[Iraq Court of Cassation], decision No. 318 of Feb. 14, 2000, reprinted in THE

JUSTICE COMPENDIUM
84
85

Id.
Id.

No. 80, 6 (Ali Muhammad Ibrahim Al Kerbasi ed., 2000).

86 Article 25 of the Ba'ath era interim constitution

of 1970 indicates that

"[f]reedom of religions, beliefs, and the exercise of religious rites is guaranteed, so
long as they do not conflict with the provisions of the constitution and they do not
contradict general morals and order." Article 25, Al-Doustour al-Iraqi al-Mouakkat
[The Interim Iraqi Constitution] of 1970. The only real reference to Islam is the
indication in Article 4 that "Islam is the religion of the state." See id., art. 4. This
hardly compares to the more significant references set forth in the 2005 Constitution.
See The Constitution of Iraq.
87 See Hamoudi, supra note 33, at 701 (noting secular training of Iraqi judiciary).

406 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31:387

Apostasy was so reviled that freedom of religion effectively did not exist
for Muslims in Saddam-era Iraq, even for those coerced into adopting
Islam, and even though no law criminalized conversions.
But that was then and this is now. Nobody in Saddam-era Iraq could
take constitutional rights and freedoms very seriously, particularly the
guarantee of freedom of religion and religious exercise granted in Article
25 of the 1970 Interim Constitution.8 8 Even the majority Shi'a Muslim
population could not freely conduct their own religious rites during that
time." Whatever the Court might have been interpreting and ignoring
was done in the context of a totalitarian dictatorship, under the auspices
of an interim constitution nobody had voted for.9" It is fair to ask
whether things might be different under a negotiated constitution
approved in a popular referendum.
The 2005 Constitution, on its own terms, gives reasons to be hopeful.
As mentioned in the previous section, Article 2 obligates the state to
"guarantee[ ] the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and
practice of all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean
Sabeans."9 1 Articles 41 through 43 also speak in broad terms of freedom
of conscience and freedom of religious exercise, without suggesting that
the freedom is limited by the religion of the individual seeking to assert
her right.9" Limitations on conversions from Islam would have been easy
to include as a technical matter, yet were not. This omission, in the context of such strong language in favor of religious freedom, is noteworthy.
However, a reason for this constitutional language exists that has nothing to do with religious conversions or religious freedom generally. It
relates to particular Sunni extremist movements that brand the Shi'a
apostates and justify attacking them and their places of worship on the
theory that they are apostates, or at least "rejecters" of proper Islamic
doctrine. The "lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy" were but a few of the terms used by Iraq's most well-known
Sunni terrorist, Abu Mus'ab Al Zarqawi, to describe the Shi'a in a letter
to Bin Laden.93 Given this political context, the Shi'a, who along with the
81 Article 25, AI-Doustour al-Iraqi al-Mouakkat [The Interim Iraqi Constitution]
of 1970.
89 Megan Stack, March of a Million Pilgrims Shows Shi'a Power, NEWARK STAR-

Apr. 23, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 15603321 (noting first time that Shi'a
could practice their own rites freely in decades was following the fall of Saddam).
90 AI-Doustour al-Iraqi al-Mouakkat [The Interim Iraqi Constitution] of 1970. The
interim constitution was promulgated by decree of the Revolutionary Command
Council, No. 792 of 1970. It was not therefore the product of a referendum or a
democratically elected council.
91 Article 2, The Constitution of Iraq.
LEDGER,

92 Id.,

arts. 41-43.

9 Letter from Abu Mus'ab AI-Zarqawi to Osama Bin Laden (Feb. 2004), available
at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgatelstate/31694.htm.
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process, 94
Kurds were largely controlling the constitutional negotiation
had no interest in granting broad sanction to historic prohibitions of apostasy in the Constitution. Hence, Article 7 of the Constitution not only
bans the Ba'ath party,95 but also bans any party that engages in the
96
The Sabian woman
"infidelization" (takfir in Arabic) of other Muslims.
seeking to return to the religion of her birth after being involuntarily converted as a child was, therefore, at least an unintended beneficiary of the
Constitution's broad grants of religious freedom.
However, the language of constitutional theocracy as it appears in the
Iraqi Constitution has provisions that seem to work in a contradictory
direction. Article 2 not only grants individuals the rights of freedom of
religion and religious exercise, it also obligates the state "to guarantee the
97
A prohisustaining of the Islamic identity for Iraq's Muslim majority."
to
be
justified
well
might
Islam
from
bition against individual conversion
of
part
currently
convert,
protect Islamic identity. After all, a prospective
altoidentity
Islamic
her
Iraq's Muslim majority, is seeking to obliterate
gether. Article 2 might now obligate the state to prevent this from
happening.
Moreover, Islam is now a "foundational source" of legislation and a
98
The Saddam-era courts at
constraint upon the issuance of legislation.
least demonstrated the Iraqi legal and political elites' strong reluctance to
reinterpret the shari'a rules concerning apostasy from what they had been
understood to have been historically, even if they were willing to rethink
other shari'a rules broadly.99 Saddam-era Iraqi elites may not have
sought to actually apply the shari'a principles on apostasy where they
were intended to apply - in the criminal law. Still, they plainly sought to
apply the historic shari'a rules on apostasy in other contexts, as the case
of the Sabian woman demonstrates." ° Given this, the impulse to continue to deny Muslims the right to register as belonging to another relig10 1
ion, even as to those involuntarily converted, would be strong.
94 ARATO, supra note 30, at 214-15.
95 Ashley S. Deeks and & Matthew D. Barton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting
History, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 26-30 (2007).
96 Article 7, The Constitution of Iraq.

97 Id., art. 2.
98 Id.

99 This was just as true during the Saddam era as it is now. Precisely at the time
that the Iraqi Court of Cassation was denying an involuntarily converted Sabian the
ability to register herself as a Sabian, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, was a
Christian. The distinction as between traditional understandings of apostasy, clung to
fiercely, and traditional understandings of dhimmi status, categorically rejected, could
hardly be starker.
100 [Iraq Court of Cassation], decision No. 318 of Feb. 14, 2000, reprinted in 80 THE
JUSTICE COMPENDIUM 6 (Ali Muhammad Ibrahim Al Kerbasi ed., 2000).

10' Article 2, The Constitution of Iraq.
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As a result, courts in most of Iraq have continued to deny religious
freedoms as they concern conversion away from Islam.'l 2 Specifically,
the Court of Cassation has upheld its earlier precedent prohibiting conversions without so much as discussing the potential constitutional
problems this engenders.10 3 For example, in 2005 an Iraqi Christian
father converted to Islam, and in so doing, effectively converted his 16year-old son as well.'0 4 Immediately upon reaching adulthood two years
later, the son sought to register himself as a Christian, but was denied by
the Court of Cassation in a decision issued in 2008.05 This decision
offered no constitutional analysis, and instead merely referred to the Saddam-era case law discussed above. 0 6 That this case law developed before
the ratification of the current Constitution, with its robust rights of religious freedom, went unmentioned by the Court.
While the Court of Cassation is not itself a constitutional court with
power to declare existing legislation unconstitutional, it would not have
had to invalidate any legislation to grant the Appellant's request, for no
legislation on the subject existed. There was only the earlier case law of
the same Court of Cassation, issued under a different constitutional
arrangement, in a legal system where cases are not supposed to contain
any precedential value.
Moreover, the Federal Supreme Court, which does address constitutional matters, does not seem particularly eager to undertake a rebalancing the tensions inherent in Article 2. The Christian individual in the
2008 case appealed twice to the same Court of Cassation under different
grounds, and was twice rebuffed. 10 7 If the Federal Supreme Court was
willing to hear his case, it could have done so. After all, the Chief Judge
of the Court of Cassation at the time also was head of the Federal
Supreme Court.
The Federal Supreme Court's reluctance is likely politically adroit. If it
were to reverse the Court of Cassation's ruling, it would risk the wrath of
powerful Islamist groups and Najaf for taking a radical step in favor of
secularizing the state. If it upheld the ruling, it would obliterate the very
idea of religious freedom for those minors forcibly converted by their
102
13

See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., [Iraq Court of Cassation], decision No. 285 of Dec. 31, 2008, reprinted
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Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See [Iraq Court of Cassation], decision No. 285 of Dec. 31, 2008, reprintedin 2
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427 (J. Razzaq Jabbar Ilwan ed., 2011); [Iraq Court of Cassation], decision
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parents to Islam, and would almost certainly earn broad international
condemnation. Neither option is particularly appealing to a new judicial
tribunal seeking to develop and enhance its social and political standing.
Hence it permits the status quo, thereby favoring the provisions on Islam,
but only by implication.
A very different result was reached however in Iraqi Kurdistan, with its
relatively more secular population. A 2004 case before the Kurdistan
Court of Cassation involved a Christian child whose parents had sepa1 9
rated.1 °8 The father remained Christian and had custody of the child."
They resided in the Kurdistan region, which retained an autonomous
political and legal system entirely independent of the rest of Iraq from
1991 until the end of the Saddam era in 2003.110 In 1992 the mother conThe
verted to Islam in the non-Kurdistan controlled city of Mosul.'
issue before the Court was whether the child could register as a Christian
upon becoming an adult, despite his mother's conversion. The lower
court had ruled in a manner similar to Iraqi courts outside Kurdistan, and
x2
found that the child was now a Muslim and no conversion was possible.
Issuing its decision, ironically, on Christmas Day 2004, the Kurdistan
Court of Cassation reversed on three grounds. 113 First, the mother's
change of religion occurred outside of Kurdistan at a time when the child
had no relationship or contact with his mother. Under such circumstances, the Court reasoned that the son had not "rejected" Islam by
''converting" to Christianity given the tenuous relationship he had to his
114
mother at the time.
Second, a 2004 Transitional Administrative Law ("TAL") (effectively,
an interim constitution in effect at the time, partly drafted by the United
States)," 5 granted a broad right of religious exercise and also prevented
the passing of any law that conflicted with the rights and freedoms of
Iraqis.1 16 The Court held that forcing the son to remain a Muslim violated these provisions. The TAL language is similar to that found in
108

[Court of Cassation for the Region of Kurdistan], unnumbered decision of Dec.

25, 2004 (Iraq), reprinted in 45 A SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION IN THE
COURTS AND CENTERS OF JUSTICE 25 (J. Abdullah Ali Sherfani ed., 2006).
109 Id.
110 ALLAWI, supra note 31, at 73 (noting that much of the work toward creating an
entire political authority took place after 1996).
111 [Court of Cassation for the Region of Kurdistan], unnumbered decision of Dec.
25, 2004 (Iraq), reprinted in 45 A SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION IN THE
COURTS AND CENTERS OF JUSTICE 25 (J. Abdullah Ali Sherfani ed., 2006).
112 Id.
113 Id.
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supra note 31, at 220-22 (describing roles of different parties,
including the United States, in finalizing the TAL).
116 The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period of
Mar. 8, 2004, art. 7 [hereinafter TAL].
115 ALLAWI,
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Iraq's current permanent Constitution. 17 The Kurdistan Court of Cassation thus chose to do what the Iraqi Court of Cassation had declined to
do: invoke the constitutional question and suggest that preventing an
adult from changing his or her religion was an unconstitutional interference with religious exercise, notwithstanding other provisions that
enshrined Islam as the state religion and prohibited the enactment of laws
contradicting Islamic tenets. 1 8 In other words, unlike the Iraqi courts
outside Kurdistan, the Court resolved the tensions that inhere in Article 2
of the permanent constitution in a manner that secularized the state.
Third and most remarkably, the Kurdistan Court of Cassation suggested a far more liberal construction of the shari'a itself than would
more traditional jurists. In other words, not only did it reason that in this
particular context shari'a did not apply, it also implicitly suggested that
shari'a deserved re-thinking. Citing a verse of the Qur'an that specifically
declares "there shall be no compulsion in religion," the Court indicated
that compelling this individual to be a Muslim was itself contrary to
Islam.'1 9 Such a modern approach
stands at odds with the positions of
120
many traditionalist jurists.
It is unclear how far the Kurdistan Court of Cassation would be willing
to advance this position. After all, the first reason for reversal is in some
tension with the third, and the Court does not attempt to manage that
tension. One cannot easily maintain that the apostasy rules were not
intended to apply in the specific context of a child having no contact with
a converted parent and simultaneously hold that the same apostasy rules
are an affront to sacred text. Yet the Court's reasoning is still noteworthy
as it reveals a strong willingness by the more secular-minded Kurdistan
judges to resolve tensions between shari'a and constitutionally and globally recognized rights and freedoms in a manner favoring the latter, at
least relative to Iraqi courts outside Kurdistan. More importantly, it
reveals a cautious attempt to help resolve these tensions by reinterpreting
Islam itself in a manner that renders it more congenial to contemporary
human rights schemes as they concern to religious freedoms.
This may well suggest more significant changes in the years ahead. The
position that the Kurdistan Court of Cassation announced - that Islam
117 Id. There are important differences, though not significant enough to deserve
mention in the main text in this particular context. Most notably, Article 7 only
requires the state to "respect" the Islamic identity of Iraq's Muslim population, not to
guarantee that such identity be sustained. Id.
118 [Court of Cassation for the Region of Kurdistan], unnumbered decision of Dec.
25, 2004 (Iraq), reprinted in 45 A SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION IN THE
COURTS AND CENTERS OF JUSTICE 25 (J. Abdullah Ali Sherfani ed., 2006).
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI'AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
220 (2008) (while criticizing the traditional approach as being entirely incompatible
with any reasonable conception of religious freedom, Kamali notes its continued
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itself forbids apostasy - is not the invention of the Court, but is in fact a
particularly favored approach among an increasing number of contemporary Muslim authorities. The renowned Muhammad Hashim Kemali has
indicated that the Qur'an does not criminalize apostasy and that Prophetic example only directed punishment against those who had committed the equivalent of treason, not against those engaged in a non-hostile
renunciation of faith.121 Abdulaziz Sachedina has put together a formidable work entitled The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism, which
argues that the dictates of Islamic revelatory text indicates that Muslims
pluralistic state, and that apostasy per se
should strive towards an ethical
122
is not a religious offense.
Currently, traditionalism is ascendant in much of the Arab world. Iraqi
courts do not permit conversions away from Islam, and Egyptian courts
have, in the recent past, gone so far as to impose divorces on happily
married couples on the grounds that one of them had "rejected" Islam by
virtue of pronouncing unorthodox religious views. 12 3 When Abdulaziz
Sachedina attempted to present his views on Islamic pluralism to Grand
Ayatollah Sistani, the meeting did not go well, to understate the incident. 24 Sachedina's report suggests that Sistani offered to supplant much
of his salary to stop Sachedina from spreading his heterodox and "unIslamic" views. 2 51 Sachedina is a professor at the University of Virginia,
and Sistani is deemed the most learned Shi'i jurist in the clerical academies of Najaf. Quite plainly, the latter wields considerably more influence. Still, the fact that a debate exists, and that the debate has at least
penetrated the consciousness of a significant court in the region, is not a
matter to be gainsaid. After all, it was not long ago that the notion of the
political equality for religious minorities would have been considered an
affront to Islam, and it is no longer.
V.

CONCLUSION

In these short pages, I could not hope to expound at length on the
tensions between religious rules granting priority to Islam and the rights
and freedoms that appear in modern constitutions that presume a secular
polity at least to some extent. These tensions are inherent in the modern
Islamic constitutional theocratic state and deserve greater attention than
they have received. I have only sought to isolate and identify some particular tensions, specifically, the place of the non-Muslims in the Islamic
constitutional theocratic state, and their place in one emerging democracy
121 See, e.g., id. at 220-21.
122 ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, THE ISLAMIC ROOTS OF DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM

97-101 (2001).

123 See, e.g., Stilt, surpa note 22, at 734-40 (describing the case of Nasr Abu Zayd).
124 Personal Account, Abdulaziz Sachedina, What Happened in Najap., http://

islam.uga.edu/sachedina-silencing.html
125 Id.

(last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
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in the region, Iraq. In so doing, I hope to have shown that these tensions
are real, and while they at times work to the significant detriment of nonMuslim minorities, they are nuanced and complex. First of all, broader
global conceptions of religious freedom have, to some extent, permeated
the region and the worldviews of the constitutional theocrats. Secondly,
even where traditional concepts of shari'a reign, their applicability to law
is hardly assured. At times, such as in the banning of loan interest, shari'a
laws are generally ignored. At other times, such as in family law, they are
decidedly not ignored. And at still other times, as in apostasy, they have
important secondary effects, but do not affect the originally intended area
of law. Finally, the content of the shari'ais often the subject of significant
contestation. Observing how these nuances affect shari'a's role in the
Arab world's rising democracies will no doubt prove fascinating in the
years to come.

